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1. Introduction 
 
Several theories in economic science support the decentralization of government 
powers. The common denominator of these theories is the assertion that decentralization 
raises efficiency. Foremost among them is fiscal federalism, though other areas of 
economic science have also used the efficiency argument in support of decentralization. 
Oates (2005) notes the adoption of industrial-organization models by fiscal federalism 
theory, justifying decentralization on the grounds of the existence of asymmetric 
information and accountability. On this view, fiscal decentralization is justified not only 
by the existence of differences in citizens’ preferences but by the fact that their 
proximity to the government responsible for the provision of public services increases 
their control over politicians. In the same vein, one of the arguments that political 
economy uses to support the decentralization of government or political power 
(Lockwood, 2006) is the increase in political accountability: politicians’ rent-seeking 
activities are under tighter control in a decentralized context because citizen-voters are 
more involved and better-informed. This resulting increase in citizen participation 
fosters government accountability and raises efficiency. 
 
So if we accept that fiscal decentralization increases the control citizens have over 
politicians, fosters accountability, and raises efficiency, the next step is to analyse the 
socioeconomic characteristics of citizens (potential voters) that increase their control 
over local policy-makers in a decentralized context, and thus improve efficiency in the 
provision of local public services. A primary objective of the present article is, 
therefore, to examine the relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
population and technical efficiency. 
 
We examine the following socioeconomic variables: the population’s income and 
educational levels, the level of commercial and tourist activity in the local economy, the 
proportion of pensioners, and the proportion of the population entitled to vote in local 
elections. Even though the relationships between income, educational levels of the 
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population and levels of efficiency have frequently been examined1, this article provides 
a new focus and a new theoretical argument. Giménez and Prior (2007) and Balaguer 
and Prior (2009) studied the influence of commercial and tourist activity on efficiency, 
but did not use these variables to carry out a theoretical analysis on citizens’ control. In 
our study, we examine the degree of control exerted by population groups active in 
retail trade or tourism and the consequences of this control in terms of efficiency. These 
groups are particularly relevant to our study because they have a strong economic 
interest in maintaining or improving the quantity and quality of local public services and 
are likely to act as local lobbies. The retired are another population group of interest to 
us, because for them controlling local government activity has a low opportunity cost. 
As for the proportion of the population entitled to vote, this variable is representative of 
the demographic structure of the population and also reflects the relative weight of the 
percentage of immigrants without voting rights (Geys et al., 2009). The entitlement to 
vote affects the degree of control that citizens can exercise over politicians through local 
elections. 
 
The second objective of the article is to analyse the relation between the fiscal 
characteristics of local governments and efficiency. Here, we investigate whether the 
fiscal characteristics of the municipality influence accountability and the degree of 
control that citizens exercise over local politicians. The fiscal variables analysed are the 
levels of taxation and transfers. Does a high level of taxation increase citizen control 
over local policy-makers? Does a high level of transfers produce fiscal illusion and thus 
reduce the control citizens may exercise over politicians? Some studies have related 
these variables to efficiency (for example De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996a, 1996b; Balaguer and Prior, 2009), but none to date have analysed them 
together with the socioeconomic characteristics mentioned above. Our analysis aims to 
offer a broad perspective of the fiscal and socioeconomic factors that increase citizens’ 
control over the activities of politicians. 
 
The study is restricted to a sample of 102 Spanish municipalities of between 5,000 and 
20,000 inhabitants in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. All data refer to 2005. 
                                                 
1
 See, for the case of income level, De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) (1996b), for 
educational levels De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), Afonso and Fernandes (2008); finally Geys and 
Moesen (2009) who study both variables (levels of income and education). 
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As the municipalities are from the same region and have the same level of 
responsibility, the sample has a high degree of homogeneity2, but efficiency levels show 
enough statistical variation. In contrast to previous literature reports which have 
considered municipalities with highly varied populations, this study explores whether 
the factors that influence local efficiency may differ between municipalities of very 
similar characteristics. We expect that certain factors which appear to be decisive when 
explaining differences in efficiency will no longer appear to be so, given the great 
similarity of responsibilities and characteristics; at the same time, other factors analysed 
will gain in explanatory power. 
 
The efficiency analysis is global, that is, we examine the technical efficiency of the total 
set of municipal public services. This analysis allows us to determine the global 
management capacity of local governments, treating them as multi-service production 
units. This is important from the point of view of accountability, because citizens 
evaluate the activity of the government as a whole and do not simply concentrate on one 
particular service. Similarly, the analysis of global efficiency makes sense when the 
explanatory variables of efficiency refer to the institutions of the government of the 
municipality (Borge et al., 2008), and, in the present study, to its residents as well. A 
thorough review of similar studies can be found in De Borger and Kerstens (2000) and 
Worthington and Dollery (2000a). Afonso and Fernandes (2008) describe studies that 
measure global municipal efficiency using non-parametric techniques. More recent 
studies that analyse global efficiency at a municipal level are those of Balaguer et al. 
(2007), Borge et. al (2008), Geys and Moesen (2009), and Giménez and Prior (2007). 
 
In contrast to the majority of analyses of global efficiency, which are multi-output, this 
study uses a composite indicator for municipal activity based on data relating to the 
output of different municipal services as an output variable. Few studies to date have 
used a global output indicator representing all municipal public services (Borge et al., 
2008; Afonso et al., 2005; Afonso and Fernández, 2006, 2008). In addition, the method 
used for calculating the global indicator in this article introduces a variation from the 
one used in the studies mentioned. This, together with the use of a broad range of 
                                                 
2
 The responsibilities of Spanish municipalities vary according to ranges of population size. For this 
reason, municipalities in the 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitant range have the same responsibilities with regard 
to revenue and expenditure. 
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information relating to the output of local public services, is another strong point of the 
analysis presented here. 
 
Our methodology is based on the conventional procedure for two-stage analysis which 
estimates first the efficiency levels of each of the municipalities and then the factors that 
explain this efficiency. Specifically, we estimate the technical efficiency of the 
municipalities from the production frontier calculated with the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) linear programming technique. In the second stage, using a Tobit type 
estimation (censored models) and bootstrap methods developed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007), we show how the above-mentioned variables can influence efficiency scores. 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, the analysis of efficiency 
carried out is presented: the methodology, the variables used, and the results. Section 3 
contains the second stage of the analysis and includes a description of the econometric 
model and the hypothesis for the impact of citizens’ socioeconomic characteristics and 
of the fiscal and control variables on efficiency. Finally, the main conclusions of the 
study are gathered together in section 4. 
 
2. Efficiency analysis 
 
2.1. Methodology: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) framework 
 
DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) is a non-parametric approach for measuring the 
technical efficiency of a set of productive units. Being a non-parametric method, DEA 
does not a priori specify a functional form, but some formal properties that satisfy the 
points of the production set. Farrell’s study (1957) was a forerunner of this approach 
and established the hypothesis of free disposal of inputs and outputs, convexity, and 
proportionality. In general, the term DEA is used for methods assuming convexity and 
for methods calculating efficiency through linear programming techniques. DEA was 
developed by Charnes et al. (1978a and 1978b), based on Farrell’s seminal work. The 
model uses linear programming techniques to compare the efficiency of a set of units 
that produce similar outputs from a common set of inputs. 
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It is not the purpose of this study to describe DEA in detail. We only indicate that this 
technique can be understood as an extension of the traditional analysis of input/output 
ratios analysis. The efficiency of the unit under evaluation is defined as the ratio of the 
weighted sum of outputs in relation to a weighted sum of inputs. The weights used are 
generated by the technique itself. Therefore, if we take n units consuming m inputs and 
producing s outputs, the efficiency of a unit can be measured as follows: 
 
∑
∑
=
=
=
m
i
ii
r
s
r
r
XV
YU
hMax
1
0
0
1
0 )(  (1) 
Subject to: 
U Y
V X
r
r
s
rj
i ij
i
m
=
=
∑
∑
≤1
1
1            j = 1….n                               
Ur, Vi > 0       r = 1….s       i = 1….m 
 
where: 
h0: is the score of efficiency of the unit evaluated. 
Yr0: is the quantity of output r produced by the unit evaluated. 
Xi0: is the quantity of input i consumed by the unit evaluated.  
Yrj: is the quantity of output r produced by the unit j. 
Xij: is the quantity of input i consumed by the unit j. 
Ur: is the weighting assigned to output r. 
Vi: is the weighting assigned to input i. 
 
By solving the linear programming problem, for each of the units analysed we can 
calculate the set of weights for the inputs and outputs that produces a score of greater 
efficiency, with the sole condition that using the same set of weights none of the other 
units examined obtains a ratio of efficiency greater than one. If in this way a group of 
weights can be found with which the score of efficiency of the unit being evaluated is 
equal to one, the unit will be considered efficient. If this is not the case, the unit will be 
considered relatively inefficient. 
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The above formulation corresponds to fractional programming. However, the model can 
easily be presented as a problem of linear programming. In the input-orientation, and 
supposing variable returns to scale, the model can be presented as follows: 
 
Min θ0 (2) 
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where θ 0 is a score of the efficiency of the unit 0. 
 
DEA provides specific information on the units analysed, offering individual scores of 
efficiency for each one. It also provides reference groups and objectives for 
consumption and production for the units evaluated as inefficient. 
 
 
2.2. Estimation of municipal efficiency 
 
2.2.1. Sample 
 
The sample analysed in this study comprised Catalan municipalities of between 5,000 
and 20,000 inhabitants. In this way we guarantee a large number of observations and a 
similar level of responsibility and ensure that the units being compared are highly 
homogeneous. Article 26 of Spain’s Local Government Act (Amended) defines the 
following minimum responsibilities for all municipalities: public lighting; cemeteries; 
refuse collection; street cleaning; domestic drinking water supply; sewerage; road 
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access to towns and villages; paving of public roads; control of food and drink. In 
municipalities of more than 5,000 inhabitants, the following are also obligatory: public 
parks; public libraries; markets; waste disposal treatment. 
 
In addition, municipalities may carry out complementary activities in areas that are 
generally the responsibility of other government offices: for example, in education, 
culture, support for women, housing, health, and protection of the environment. As all 
our municipalities belong to a single Autonomous Community, we ensure that this set 
of responsibilities is homogeneous throughout our dataset.  
 
Our analysis focuses on 2005, and all the variables used refer to that year. The 
budgetary data come from the accounts of local entities available on-line from the 
Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. 
 
Of the 131 Catalan municipalities with 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants in 2005, 29 were 
eliminated due to lack of data. The analysis was therefore carried out for 102 
municipalities. 
 
2.2.2. Characteristics of DEA estimation  
 
Efficiency can be estimated from two viewpoints: output orientation, and input 
orientation. Here we use input orientation: that is to say, the object is to reduce the 
consumption of inputs while maintaining the level of output. In Farrell’s terms, 
efficiency is the fraction of the total inputs that suffices to keep the level of production 
constant. This is the approach used by most studies of the efficiency of local 
governments, as it is understood that they have greater ability to decide over inputs than 
over outputs, given that the latter are determined by the institutional context that 
imposes uniformity on the goods and services to be provided. 
 
Similarly, efficiency has been estimated with variable returns to scale. Most studies 
apply this type of return as it gives the model greater flexibility and helps to adapt it to 
the context of the municipality. 
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The model presented here consists of two inputs and one output. These variables are 
described in detail below. 
 
2.2.3. Input indicators 
 
We used two variables as inputs: current operating expenditure, and capital expenditure 
(non-financial investment and capital grants). Both variables are expressed in per capita 
terms. This expenditure is representative of the cost of the municipal services provided. 
In addition, including capital expenditure means considering the investment expenditure 
that local entities make on a regular basis, such as expenditure on the maintenance of 
municipal facilities and equipment, which has a direct repercussion on the quality of the 
services provided. Current operating expenditure and capital expenditure are used as 
inputs in most studies of the overall efficiency of local governments (De Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996b; Afonso and Fernandes, 2008, Balaguer et al. 2007; Balaguer and Prior, 
2009; Muñiz and Zafra, 2009). As Afonso and Fernandes (2006) point out, using 
municipal expenditure per capita ensures that all inputs are considered in the analysis. 
 
2.2.4. Output indicator 
 
Studies that analyse efficiency come up against the problem of defining and quantifying 
output (because of the multiplicity, intangibility and indivisibility of the various public 
services) and the lack of a market price for this output (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a; 
Levitt and Joyce, 1987). The solution provided in most studies is to use approximate 
variables as outputs, related in some way to the services provided by municipal 
governments (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a) and, specifically, physical indicators that 
are representative of public production. At this point it is important to avoid the problem 
of confusing indicators of demand with indicators of results. To do so, we pay attention 
to the specific responsibilities that councils have in the different areas, although at times 
it is difficult or impractical not to use the same indicator as the statistics on indicators of 
results at a municipal level are very limited or may even be non-existent. 
 
The indicator of output must represent the set of services that the municipalities 
provide. Given that the services offered by municipalities are very varied and not all 
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have the same cost or the same budgetary weight, we constructed a global municipal 
output indicator following Afonso and Fernández (2006, 2008) and Borge et al. (2008), 
but included a variation that improved the measurement. Specifically, Afonso and 
Fernández construct a global output indicator giving the same weighting to the different 
output indicators that make up the global indicator. On the other hand, Borge et al. 
(2008) weight each indicator for the various services according to the relative 
importance that the expenditure on the service has in the local budget in aggregate terms 
in order to create the global output indicator. This means that each output indicator is 
given a specific weighting which is the same in all the municipalities. 
 
In this study, each output indicator included in the global output indicator was weighted 
according to the relative weight of the expenditure on the service in the accounts of each 
municipality. The construction of the global municipal output indicator (GMOI) is 
detailed below. 
 
Firstly, in order to find the output indicators that best represent the provision of local 
services, we used the functional classification of the budgets of the local entities, 
disaggregating them to the greatest detail possible. For each function (disaggregation to 
two digits) or sub-function (disaggregation to three digits) we chose the output indicator 
that best represents the provision of the service. 
 
In this study we had a very broad budget database which allowed us to determine the 
cost of very specific municipal services. In addition, we used a large number of output 
indicators which in turn are much more precise than those used in previous studies of 
Spain and offer a better representation of the municipal services provided. Among the 
interesting new indicators are the number of local police officers, the number of infants 
registered in municipal nurseries, the number of infant and primary classes in publicly-
funded schools, and the consumption of water. 
 
Table 1 displays the functional classification in detail, the aggregate amount provided 
for each function or sub-function by the set of municipalities that make up the sample, 
the relative weight of each function or sub-function, and the output indicator used. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Specifically, for the function ‘civil defence and public security’ the variable used, the 
number of local police officers, approximates the result (which would be the level of 
security). It is assumed that the higher the number of police officers the greater the 
security. 
 
For the municipal nursery service, the indicator of results is the number of infants 
registered in public centres. In this case, this indicator does not need to reflect demand 
for the service (which may be greater than the number of places offered) but expresses 
the result directly (children in nursery school). This indicator has not been used as an 
output in studies of Spain because it is difficult to obtain. 
 
Expenditure on primary and secondary education (the largest part of education 
spending) covers the expenditure made by councils as part of their responsibility to 
collaborate in the construction of schools and take charge of maintenance and cleaning 
in the centres for children aged from three to twelve. Given the content of this 
responsibility, we used the number of classrooms as the indicator of output at municipal 
level, rather than the number of pupils. 
 
For the rest of the spending on education (transport, grants, school meals, etc.), since no 
data were available on the beneficiaries of these activities and they are services of a 
personal nature, the output variable was considered to be the number of pupils aged 
from three to twelve in the municipality. 
 
The indicator used as output for sewerage, water supply and distribution was the 
consumption of municipal water. 
 
We used the number of tons of refuse and kilometres of paved roads as the output of the 
refuse collection and the street cleaning services. This latter indicator was also taken as 
output for the sub-function roads, neighbourhood paths and urban public roads, given 
that the greatest part of this expenditure corresponds to investment in maintenance. 
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As regards outputs relating to the sub-functions of culture and sports, we used the area 
allocated to cultural activities and the area of covered and open spaces for sports, since 
more precise indicators of services and activities of this type are unavailable at 
municipal level. Nevertheless, these variables approximate the output, since the cultural 
facilities variable includes cultural centres, libraries, civic centres and museums, and the 
sports facilities variable includes sports complexes, sports grounds, swimming pools, 
ball-game courts, and so on. 
 
The rest of the functions and sub-functions mainly involve basic regulatory 
administrative services, and so we used the population as an approximate variable for 
output. Although this variable is not a direct output, most studies consider it 
representative of this type of service (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a; Worthington and 
Dollery, 2000b; Afonso and Fernández, 2006; Balaguer et al., 2007; Giménez and Prior, 
2007; Balaguer and Prior, 2009 and Geys et al., 2009). 
 
Table 5 in the Appendix provides the definitions and statistical sources of the output 
variables used. 
 
Once the values of all the output variables used were obtained, we normalized them 
with respect to the average value of the sample to make the sample average was equal to 
one. 
 
The third step consisted in weighting each representative variable of the various 
municipal outputs according to the relative weight of spending on the service inside the 
municipal budget as a whole. This feature distinguishes our method from the one used 
by Afonso and Fernandes (2006, 2008) and by Borge et al. (2008); it adapts better to 
specific situations, as the level of services offered may vary from municipality to 
municipality in accordance with the preferences of the residents. 
 
Table 6 in the Appendix shows the value of the global municipal output indicator 
(GMOI) for the 102 municipalities analysed. 
 
2.2.5. DEA results 
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To measure the technical efficiency of the provision of municipal services, we used the 
global municipal output indicator (GMOI) as the output and the current operating 
expenditure and the capital expenditure in per capita terms as inputs. 
 
Table 7 in the Appendix shows the results of the DEA obtained with the specification of 
the model with one output/two inputs, input orientation, and with variable returns to 
scale for the year 2005. 
 
As can be seen, of the 102 municipalities, eight (approximately 8%) are totally efficient. 
The mean efficiency of the set of municipalities is 71%, so there is a margin for 
improvement in the global provision of municipal services. 
 
To qualify the efficient units we applied a method that is widely used in the DEA 
literature. We recorded the number of times that an efficient unit appears in the 
reference group of the inefficient units: a unit that appears in a large number of 
reference groups is taken to be genuinely efficient, but if a unit appears only in its own 
reference group or in a very small number of units its efficiency is considered suspect3. 
 
The top position is occupied by Santa Margarida de Montbui (mentioned 79 times), 
followed by Cervera (45 times) and La Sènia (38 times). The rest of the units that serve 
as references for other units are Caldes de Motbui (15 times), Berga (13 times), Súria 
(7) and Vilassar de Mar (2). Santa Coloma de Cervelló comes last, with only one 
reference for a single municipality. 
 
3. Explaining factors of efficiency: citizens’ control 
 
3.1. Econometric specification 
 
The standard DEA model presented only incorporates controllable and discretionary 
inputs. It does not take account the presence of environmental or non-discretionary 
                                                 
3
 Smith and Mayston (1987). 
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inputs although these factors may play an important role in the determination of output 
levels. 
 
It is therefore interesting to explain the efficiency scores obtained in the DEA using 
environmental or non-discretionary variables such as the socioeconomic characteristics 
of citizens and the fiscal characteristics of local governments. This is the aim of this 
article. In order to do so, we carry out a second stage analysis through Tobit or truncated 
regressions, as the dependent variable (score of efficiency) presents a range between 
zero and one. This procedure has been used in previous studies4. 
 
The econometric analysis is based on the following model: 
 
iii ZE εβα ++=  (3) 
 
where Ei represents the efficiency scores in local government i, Zi is a vector of 
explanatory variables representing the socioeconomic characteristics of citizens and 
local government, fiscal and environmental factors, and εi is the error term. 
 
The two-stage method has been criticized on the grounds that the results in small 
samples are likely to be biased5. This means that in equation (3) the error term εi is 
serially correlated in a complicated and unknown way. As the sample increases in size, 
this correlation gradually disappears in the DEA context. An additional source of bias 
comes from the fact that non-discretionary variables in equation (3) are correlated to the 
error term εi output. This correlation derives from the correlation between non-
discretionary inputs and the outputs, and therefore from the estimated efficiency scores. 
Again, this last correlation also disappears asymptotically, but at a slow rate6. 
 
                                                 
4
 Studies that analyse local global efficiency using non-parametric methods and explain efficiency scores 
using a second-stage Tobit analysis include the following: De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996a, 1996b), Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998), Worthington and Dollery (2000b), Moore 
et al. (2005), Afonso and Fernandes (2008), Giménez and Prior (2007) and Balaguer and Prior (2009). 
5
 See Coelli, Rao and Batesse (1998), p.171, and Simar and Wilson (2007). 
6
 Afonso and Aubyn (2005). 
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Consequently, the standard approach (Tobit) is not valid for small samples. To solve 
this problem Simar and Wilson (2007) propose using bootstrap methods. In our study, 
we applied algorithm 2 proposed by these authors with a total of 2,000 iterations. 
 
3.2. Explanatory variables 
 
To analyse the possible influence of the socioeconomic characteristics of the population 
on efficiency in the provision of municipal public services, we used the following 
variables which are described in Table 2 (along with these covariates). 
 
• Municipal income level. The literature demonstrates that citizens’ level of income 
and wealth affects the incentives for politicians and taxpayers to control the level of 
public expenditure. For example, Silkman and Young (1982) and Wyckoff (1990) 
show that higher incomes on a municipal level encourage politicians and 
administrators to grant excessive subsidies, thus increasing inefficiency. 
Nevertheless, it might also be supposed that high-income citizens are less motivated 
to control municipal expenditure because of opportunity costs. A negative relation 
between income level and efficiency can be found in the following studies: De 
Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) (1996b) and Giménez and 
Prior (2007), so we expect to find a negative relation in our study as well. 
• Citizen with higher educational level. De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) and Afonso 
and Fernandes (2008) find that a high educational level has a positive effect on 
efficiency. This relationship suggests that citizens with a high level of education 
exercise greater control over local politicians because for these individuals the 
opportunity cost of exercising this control is low. Consequently the expected sign 
for this variable is positive. 
• Level of commercial activity in the municipality. This variable is used by Balaguer 
and Prior (2009) and Giménez and Prior (2007). They find a positive relationship 
between the level of commercial activity and efficiency. If greater commercial 
activity means stronger associations or groups of retail traders, the positive 
relationship mentioned can be explained by supposing that these associations 
exercise greater control over local government, fostering efficiency. Nevertheless, 
from the point of view of the theory of interest groups, strong commercial 
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associations would also be expected to lead to less efficient municipal policies 
(Mueller and Murrell, 1986). For this reason the relationship between this variable 
and efficiency is ambiguous. 
• Level of tourist activity in the municipality. This variable can be interpreted from a 
double perspective, like the one above. On the one hand, from the point of view of 
the theory of interest groups, the rent-seeking activities of the tourist business can 
lead to more inefficient municipal policies; on the other, it could also be argued that 
tourism entrepreneurs may exercise greater control over local policy-makers, as do 
traders. In Spain, Balaguer and Prior (2009) and Giménez and Prior (2007) find a 
negative relation between this variable and efficiency. This may be due to the fact 
that tourism entrepreneurs act in a rent-seeking manner, but also to the costs of 
congestion of tourism and its seasonal nature. Consequently, the relationship 
between this variable and efficiency is also ambiguous. 
• Retired people. Retired people are a group with low opportunity costs in obtaining 
information about local government, as they do not have work commitments. For 
this reason, they can exercise greater control over local government. Persson and 
Tabellini (2000) and Besley and Pratt (2006) argue that the more informed voters 
are, the more accountability is fostered. In addition, retired people often take part in 
organisations of a local nature which can, in turn, lead them to act as a lobby or rent-
seeking group. As with the above variables, the sign of this variable is ambiguous. 
• Potential electors. In many of our municipalities a considerable part of the 
population does not have the right to vote as they are not citizens of the European 
Union. It is to be expected that the greater the number of citizens entitled to vote, the 
greater the potential control they can exercise through various elections (Geys et al, 
2009). Therefore, the relation between this variable and efficiency is expected to be 
positive. 
 
The other variables that are used to explain efficiency are of a fiscal nature (see Table 
2): 
 
• Municipal taxes. De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) show that there is a positive 
relation between tax rates and efficiency, in agreement with Davis and Hayes 
(1993), who defend the notion that a high level of taxation can increase taxpayers’ 
16
  
control of public management. Nevertheless, Balaguer et al. (2007) and Balaguer 
and Prior (2009) find a negative relation between the level of taxes per capita and 
efficiency. The explanation is that if a municipality can generate revenue easily, its 
managers are less motivated to manage resources efficiently. Similarly, if a high 
level of taxes increases control over public expenditure, this can ultimately produce 
inefficiency as it may distort the choices of inputs made by bureaucrats, who may 
choose the ones that are most visible and not those that would be most efficient for 
the production process (Lindsay, 1976). For example, police cars are more visible 
than police training (Grosskopf and Hayes, 1993). In addition, it may be that less 
efficient municipalities need higher levels of financing and, given that resources 
from transfers are limited, another way of obtaining more revenue is to make a 
greater fiscal effort. Consequently, an ambiguous relationship is to be expected 
between this variable and efficiency. 
• Municipal revenue from transfers. Transfers are expected to have a negative 
influence on efficiency as they create fiscal illusion and, consequently, what is 
known as the "flypaper effect" (Bradford and Oates, 1971; Hines and Thaler, 1995; 
and Heynelds, 2001). In addition, Geys et al. (2009) indicate that when citizens are 
confronted with financing through transfers they do not exercise as much control 
over politicians, as the local revenue does not come from their own pocket. De 
Borger and Kerstens (1996a), and Balaguer et al. (2007) and Balaguer and Prior 
(2009) verify this hypothesis, finding empirical evidence of this negative influence. 
For this reason the relation between this variable and efficiency is expected to be 
negative. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
3.3. Empirical results 
 
The results of the econometric estimation are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents 
the Tobit estimation whilst Table 4 estimates the various specifications using the 
correction proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). The results hardly change after 
correcting the estimations with this procedure. Model 1 shows the influence of the 
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socioeconomic variables on efficiency. Model 2 shows the impact of the fiscal 
variables, while model 3 includes both the socioeconomic and the fiscal variables. 
 
With regard to the socioeconomic variables: 
 
• The income variable, as expected, presents a negative sign and is statistically 
significant in models 1 and 3. Consequently, the hypothesis is verified that the 
citizens in the richer municipalities exercise less control over local government 
activity, due to the question of opportunity costs. 
 
• The level of commercial activity in the municipality is also statistically significant 
with a positive sign in models 1 and 3. This result confirms the hypothesis that 
people in commerce exercise firm control over local government, leading to more 
efficient management. 
 
• The level of tourist activity is statistically significant in models 1 and 3, showing a 
negative effect. These results corroborate those obtained by Balaguer and Prior 
(2009) and Giménez and Prior (2007). This negative relationship may be due to the 
rent-seeking activities of tourism entrepreneurs, or to the cost of congestion of 
tourism and its seasonal nature. 
 
• The proportion of retired people in the municipal population shows a positive effect 
on efficiency, but this variable is not statistically significant when we control with 
fiscal variables. This result provides some support for the hypothesis that groups of 
citizens for whom obtaining information has a low opportunity cost exercise greater 
control over local policy-makers. 
 
• The proportion of the population with the right to vote is significant and positive 
only in model 1, so the empirical evidence is weak. Nevertheless, this behaviour is 
compatible with the result for the previous variable. If a municipality has an ageing 
population, with a large number of retired people, control over local politicians is 
greater. For this reason, as the number of citizens without voting rights grows 
(immigrants and the population under 18 years old) this control diminishes. 
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With regard to the fiscal variables: 
 
• The per capita tax variable is also statistically significant with a negative sign in 
models 2 and 3. This confirms that a higher level of taxes leads politicians and 
bureaucrats to act less efficiently, as Balaguer et al. (2007) suggests. It may also be 
taken to mean that inefficiency leads to demands for higher taxes. 
 
• The transfers per capita variable has a negative sign and is significant in models 2 
and 3. This confirms the "fly-paper" hypothesis. 
 
Finally, the level of higher education in the population is not statistically significant in 
any of the models. 
 
[Insert Tables 3 & 4 here] 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents an empirical examination of the socioeconomic characteristics that 
citizens (potential voters) need in order to exercise greater control over local policy-
makers, and of the fiscal characteristics of local governments that influence this control. 
In so far as control fosters politicians’ accountability, it can be assumed to increase 
efficiency. Therefore, we examine the relation between a set of socioeconomic and 
fiscal variables and the efficiency of the provision of local public services. 
 
The empirical analysis carried out was restricted to 102 Spanish municipalities of 
between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, which were highly homogeneous in terms of 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities. 
 
Efficiency was measured using the DEA input-orientation technique. We compiled a 
global municipal output indicator (GMOI) as a single measure of local government 
activity; this was the only output variable in the DEA analysis. The results of the DEA 
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show a mean efficiency of municipal activity of 71%, indicating that there is room for 
improvement in the global provision of municipal services. 
 
In a second stage, efficiency in the provision of municipal services was explained using 
a Tobit analysis and bootstrap methods proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). The 
examination provides a certain amount of empirical evidence that a strong commercial 
sector, a significant proportion of retired people and a high proportion of population 
with the right to vote have a positive effect on local government efficiency. The 
explanation is that these groups exercise greater control over local politicians. For 
retired people, for example, obtaining information has a lower cost; and, as their level of 
information improves, they exert more control. In the case of retail traders, their 
economic interests encourage them to exercise greater control over local government. 
And as regards voting rights, those entitled to vote have more incentive to control local 
government management than those who are not. 
 
The opportunity cost of obtaining information means is also reflected in the fact that 
citizens with higher income levels exercise less control over their local government; in 
their case, obtaining information has a high opportunity cost. 
 
Similarly, a high level of tourist activity, a high municipal tax level and a high 
proportion of transfers in local financing have a negative impact on efficiency in the 
provision of local public services. The arguments that can explain this relationship are 
not related to citizens’ control but to other factors. Tourism activity brings with it 
congestion costs and seasonality in the demand for local public services, which have a 
negative influence on efficiency. Perhaps contrary to expectations, a high level of 
taxation does not lead to greater control by citizens, but the ease of obtaining income 
may demotivate local government and have a negative impact on its efficiency. We also 
demonstrate what is known as the "fly-paper effect" which is generated by finance by 
transfers. 
 
Finally, a last conclusion drawn from our article is that it provides empirical evidence 
that citizens who have lower opportunity costs in obtaining information regarding the 
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management of local public services exercise greater control over local politicians, thus 
enhancing accountability and encouraging efficiency. 
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Table 1 Municipal expenditures by functions 
Functions Euros % of 
total 
Output variables 
0 Public Debt 77,798,633.82 7.4% Population 
1 General Services 158,207,687.93 15.1% Population 
2 Civil Defence and Public Security 64,447,085.25 6.1% Number of local police officers 
3 Security, Protection, and Social Assistance 80,183,009.60 7.6% Population 
4 Production of Public Social Goods 506,721,941.18 48.3%   
41 Health 14,266,759.61 1.4% Population 
42 Education 64,827,969.59 6.2%   
42a Nursery education 2,479,808.73 0.2% Number of pupils registered in public nurseries 
42b Primary and secondary education 55,331,369.59 5.3% Number of classrooms  for children aged from three to twelve in public centres 
42c Transport services, school meals, grants and support 2,982,260.69 0.3% Number of infant (2nd cycle) and primary pupils 
registered in public centres 
42d Other education services 4,034,530.58 0.4% Number of infant (2nd cycle) and primary pupils 
registered in public centres 
43 Housing and Urban development 138,437,382.94 13.2% Population 
44 Community welfare 127,816,380.80 12.2%   
441 Drainage, supply and distribution of water 29,070,752.01 2.8% Cubic metres of water consumed 
442 Refuse collection and street cleaning 80,997,707.20 7.7% Tons of refuse and square kilometres of road 
443 Cemeteries and funeral services 3,175,103.32 0.3% Population 
44a Other social welfare services 14,572,818.27 1.4% Population 
45 Culture 147,151,571.77 14.0%   
451 Promotion and dissemination of culture 64,203,933.94 6.1% Square metres of cultural facilities 
452 Physical education, sport and recreation 74,501,973.04 7.1% Square metres of sports facilities 
453 Archaeology and protection of the Historical-artistic heritage 8,445,664.79 0.8% Population 
46 Other social and community services 14,221,876.47 1.4% Population 
5 Production of Economic Goods 113,586,210.14 10.8%   
51 Infrastructures 104,522,832.13 10.0%   
511 Roads, neighbourhood paths, urban public roads 96,475,776.22 9.2% Kms of paved roads 
512 Water resources 2,091,647.00 0.2% Population 
513 Land, sea, river and air transport 3,49,.309.79 0.3% Population 
51a Other basic infrastructures and transport 2,462,099.12 0.2% Population 
52 Communications 3,143,090.02 0.3% Population 
53 Agricultural infrastructure 5,718,212.04 0.5% Population 
54 Scientific, technical and applied research 26,184.77 0.0% Population 
55 Basic information and statistics 175,891.18 0.0% Population 
6 General economic regulation 31,997,735.17 3.1% Population 
7 Economic regulation of productive sectors 13,879,259.53 1.3% Population 
9 Transfers to Public Administrations 2,002,543.20 0.2% Population 
Total expenditure budget 1,048,824,105.82 100.0%   
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for covariates 
Variables Definition Mean (s.d.) Range Source 
Municipality income level 
Citizen with higher education level 
 
Level of commercial activity 
Level of tourist activity 
 
Retired people 
 
Potential voters 
 
Municipal taxes 
Municipal revenues from transfers  
Gross family disposable income per capita in the municipality 
% of the population with post-compulsory education 
 
Index capturing importance of commerce in the municipality 
Index capturing importance of tourism in the municipality 
 
% Population 65 years and above/Total population 
 
% Potential voters/Total population 
 
Taxes paid per inhabitant 
Revenue from transfers per inhabitant 
14,213.82 (1,998.09) 
35.28 (6.94) 
 
17.51 (12.04) 
18.19 (48.01) 
 
15.05 (3.80) 
 
72.91 (6.16) 
 
447.92 (181.59) 
296.41 (92.46) 
[10,960.61, 23,539.17] 
[20.13, 62.51] 
 
[4.00, 74.00] 
[0.00, 333.00] 
 
[7.42, 26.71] 
 
[47.95, 97.22] 
 
[202.08, 1,059.13] 
[163.89, 707.16] 
Catalan Institute of Statistics: Municipal data bank 
National Institute of Statistics: Population and housing census 
2001: Municipal territorial indicators 
La Caixa: The Spanish Annual Commercial Report  
La Caixa: The Spanish Annual Commercial Report 
 
National Institute of Statistics: Population by municipalities 
 
Institute of Social and Political Science (Autonomous University 
of Barcelona) 
Ministry of Economics and Public Finance: Territorial Statistics 
Ministry of Economics and Public Finance: Territorial Statistics 
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Table 3 Tobit estimation results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Municipality income level 
Citizens with higher education level 
Level of commercial activity 
Level of tourist activity 
Retired people 
Potential voters 
Municipal taxes 
Municipal revenues from transfers 
Constant term 
-0.00002 (0.00001)* 
0.00055 (0.00317) 
0.00317 (0.00138)** 
-0.00089 (0.00035)** 
0.01176 (0.00488)** 
0.00638 (0.00311)** 
 
 
0.29682 (0.23341) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00073 (0.00007)*** 
-0.00026 (0.00012)** 
1.12066 (0.04495)*** 
-0.00002 (0.00001)*** 
0.00101 (0.00221) 
0.00317 (0.00095)*** 
-0.00048 (0.00025)* 
0.00169 (0.00358) 
0.00012 (0.00224) 
-0.00072 (0.00007)*** 
-0.00017 (0.00012) 
1.27980 (0.18828)*** 
N 
χ2 
Log likelihood 
102 
31.63 (0.00) 
31.388 
102 
68.14 (0.00) 
54.819 
102 
102.45 (0.00) 
66.802 
Note: standard deviations are reported in brackets, whereas ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 Tobit corrected results by the procedure suggested in Simar and Wilson (2007) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Municipality income level 
Citizens with higher education level 
Level of commercial activity 
Level of tourist activity 
Retired people 
Potential voters 
Municipal taxes 
Municipal revenues from transfers 
Constant term 
-0.00002 (0.00001)* 
0.00013 (0.00404) 
0.00440 (0.00176)** 
-0.00121 (0.00046)*** 
0.01495 (0.00620)** 
0.00858 (0.00398)** 
 
 
0.04095 (0.29826) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00042 (0.00012)*** 
-0.00063 (0.00028)** 
0.95996 (0.08868)*** 
-0.00003 (0.00001)*** 
0.00080 (0.00282) 
0.00446 (0.00121)*** 
-0.00070 (0.00032)** 
0.00209 (0.00452) 
0.00039 (0.00286) 
-0.00096 (0.00009)*** 
-0.00029 (0.00017)* 
1.35542 (0.23951)*** 
N 
χ2 
Log likelihood 
102 
33.59 (0.00) 
16.447 
102 
11.92 (0.00) 
0.2879 
102 
111.10 (0.00) 
55.090 
Note: standard deviations are reported in brackets, whereas ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5 Data and statistical sources used to create the global municipal output indicator (GMOI) 
 
Indicator Variable Observations Statistical source 
Population Municipal population on 1st January 2005  National Institute of Statistics (INE): 
Municipal records 
Local Police Officers Number of local police officers per 1000 
inhabitants 
Some municipalities do not have police officers but security 
guards. In this case the information was obtained from 
information on municipal employees in provincial bulletins 
Catalan Institute of Statistics (IDESCAT): 
Municipal data bank 
Pupils in nursery schools Pupils aged 3 - 4 in publicly-funded schools  Generalitat of Catalonia: Department of Education: Annual 
statistics/Year 2005-2006 
Classrooms for pupils aged 3 - 12 
at publicly-funded schools   
Classrooms for pupils aged 3 - 12 at publicly-
funded schools  
 Generalitat of Catalonia: Department of Education: Annual 
statistics/Year 2005-2006 
Pupils aged 3 - 12 at publicly-
funded schools  
Pupils aged 3 - 12 at publicly-funded schools   Generalitat of Catalonia: Department of Education: Annual 
statistics/Year 2005-2006 
Water consumption M3 of water consumed The information is only available at the district level so an 
estimation was made for the municipalities on the basis of 
the weight of its population in the total for the district 
Catalan Water Agency (ACA): Municipal statistics 
Tons of refuse Tons of refuse  Catalan Waste Agency: Municipal statistics 
Metropolitan Environmental Agency: Environmental data 
Kilometres of paved roads Surface area of paved roads  Ministry of Public Administration (MAP): Survey of local 
infrastructures, 2000 
Area of cultural facilities M3 of indoor cultural centres Includes arts centres, libraries, civic centres, museums and 
other facilities 
Ministry of Public Administration (MAP): Survey of local 
infrastructures, 2000 
Area of sports facilities M3 of indoor and outdoor sports facilities Includes sports halls, sports courts, swimming pools, ball-
game courts and others 
Ministry of Public Administration (MAP): Survey of local 
infrastructures, 2000 
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Table 6  
Global municipal output indicator (GMOI) 2005 
Municipality GMOI  Municipality GMOI 
Abrera 0.9154  Santa Eulàlia de Ronçana 0.6651 
Ametlla del Vallès (L') 0.8669  Santa Margarida de Montbui 0.8226 
Arenys de Munt 0.7852  Santa Maria de Palautordera 0.8569 
Argentona 1.2404  Sant Vicenç de Castellet 0.7655 
Begues 0.7816  Súria 0.6758 
Berga 1.4598  Taradell 0.7662 
Bigues i Riells 0.8071  Tona 0.6145 
Cabrils 0.7000  Torelló 1.2129 
Caldes de Montbui 1.3992  Vallirana 1.1253 
Calella 1.3853  Viladecavalls 0.8691 
Canet de Mar 1.0966  Anglès 0.6514 
Canovelles 1.2318  Arbúcies 0.5862 
Cardedeu 1.2860  Banyoles 1.7119 
Cardona 0.5343  Bisbal d'Empordà (La) 1.4192 
Castellbisbal 0.7044  Cassà de la Selva 0.8369 
Centelles 0.6495  Castelló d'Empúries 0.9251 
Cervelló 0.9840  Escala (L') 1.1306 
Corbera de Llobregat 0.6323  Llagostera 0.6915 
Cubelles 1.1974  Palamós 1.2869 
Gelida 0.7365  Puigcerdà 1.4019 
Llagosta (La) 1.1208  Roses 1.7172 
Llinars del Vallès 0.9937  Sant Hilari Sacalm 0.7818 
Lliçà de Vall 0.7380  Santa Coloma de Farners 1.0522 
Malgrat de Mar 1.3210  Tossa de Mar 0.6671 
Manlleu 1.7069  Vidreres 0.7252 
Masquefa 0.8681  Agramunt 0.5159 
Matadepera 0.6798  Alcarràs 0.7850 
Montmeló 0.9855  Almacelles 0.7347 
Montornès del Vallès 1.4207  Balaguer 1.3744 
Navarcles 0.5211  Borges Blanques (Les) 0.6712 
Navàs 0.4657  Cervera 2.2514 
Palau-solità i Plegamans 1.3252  Mollerussa 1.1598 
Pallejà 0.8581  Seu d'Urgell (La) 1.2651 
Parets del Vallès 1.5812  Tàrrega 1.4075 
Polinyà 0.8488  Tremp 0.7938 
Roca del Vallès (La) 0.8338  Vielha e Mijaran 0.9310 
Roda de Ter 0.5641  Alcanar 0.7237 
Sallent 0.7744  Amposta 1.9334 
Santpedor 0.6127  Calafell 1.9565 
Sant Andreu de Llavaneres 1.0244  Sènia (La) 0.6467 
Sant Celoni 1.4864  Cunit 0.9603 
Sant Esteve Sesrovires 0.6354  Montblanc 0.7222 
Sant Fost de Campsentelles 0.6816  Mont-roig del Camp 1.2261 
Sant Fruitós de Bages 0.7821  Móra d'Ebre 1.2831 
Vilassar de Dalt 0.7583  Riudoms 0.5975 
Sant Joan de Vilatorrada 1.0510  Roquetes 0.5488 
Vilassar de Mar 1.6220  Sant Carles de la Ràpita 1.1129 
Premià de Dalt 1.1317  Torredembarra 1.0798 
Sant Quirze del Vallès 1.5861  Ulldecona 0.7317 
Sant Sadurní d'Anoia 1.1089  Vila-seca 1.8793 
Santa Coloma de Cervelló 0.7909   Deltebre 1.0054 
Average    1.0052 
Standard deviation    0.3729 
Maximum    2.2514 
Minimum       0.4657 
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Table 7 
Results of the DEA: 1 output (GMOI) and 2 inputs (per capita operating 
expenditure and per capita capital expenditure) 
 
Municipality DEA  Municipality DEA 
 Abrera 0.5500   Santa Eulàlia de Ronçana 0.6830 
 Ametlla del Vallès (L') 0.6000   Santa Margarida de Montbui 1.0000 
 Arenys de Munt 0.6500   Santa Maria de Palautorder 0.8170 
 Argentona 0.6860   Sant Vicenç de Castellet 0.8920 
 Begues 0.4810   Súria 1.0000 
 Berga 1.0000   Taradell 0.8560 
 Bigues i Riells 0.5970   Tona 0.6470 
 Cabrils 0.5640   Torelló 0.9310 
 Caldes de Montbui 1.0000   Vallirana 0.6350 
 Calella 0.7260   Viladecavalls 0.6020 
 Canet de Mar 0.6970   Anglès 0.7010 
 Canovelles 0.9460   Arbúcies 0.6860 
 Cardedeu 0.8880   Banyoles 0.9670 
 Cardona 0.9080   Bisbal d'Empordà (La) 0.8090 
 Castellbisbal 0.4180   Cassà de la Selva 0.7250 
 Centelles 0.6240   Castelló d'Empúries 0.3210 
 Cervelló 0.7110   Escala (L') 0.3740 
 Corbera de Llobregat 0.5750   Llagostera 0.6580 
 Cubelles 0.6460   Palamós 0.8030 
 Gelida 0.6890   Puigcerdà 0.7230 
 Llagosta (La) 0.9730   Roses 0.4800 
 Llinars del Vallès 0.6990   Sant Hilari Sacalm 0.6960 
 Lliçà de Vall 0.4030   Santa Coloma de Farners 0.6860 
 Malgrat de Mar 0.7880   Tossa de Mar 0.2610 
 Manlleu 0.8680   Vidreres 0.6730 
 Masquefa 0.7640   Agramunt 0.7890 
 Matadepera 0.5490   Alcarràs 0.5860 
 Montmeló 0.7500   Almacelles 0.8030 
 Montornès del Vallès 0.7140   Balaguer 0.8920 
 Navarcles 0.7820   Borges Blanques (Les) 0.7330 
 Navàs 0.6990   Cervera 1.0000 
 Palau-solità i Plegamans 0.7250   Mollerussa 0.6980 
 Pallejà 0.7130   Seu d'Urgell (La) 0.6740 
 Parets del Vallès 0.6880   Tàrrega 0.7170 
 Polinyà 0.5290   Tremp 0.6850 
 Roca del Vallès (La) 0.6330   Vielha e Mijaran 0.6640 
 Roda de Ter 0.7610   Alcanar 0.8490 
 Sallent 0.6610   Amposta 0.9710 
 Santpedor 0.6280   Calafell 0.5720 
 Sant Andreu de Llavaneres 0.5450   S‚nia (La) 1.0000 
 Sant Celoni 0.7070   Cunit 0.3650 
 Sant Esteve Sesrovires 0.3400   Montblanc 0.6620 
 Sant Fost de Campsentelles 0.6090   Mont-roig del Camp 0.4360 
 Sant Fruitós de Bages 0.5660   Móra d'Ebre 0.9880 
 Vilassar de Dalt 0.5490   Riudoms 0.7340 
 Sant Joan de Vilatorrada 0.8480   Roquetes 0.9010 
 Vilassar de Mar 1.0000   Sant Carles de la Ràpita 0.8500 
 Premià de Dalt 0.7020   Torredembarra 0.4740 
 Sant Quirze del Vallès 0.8010   Ulldecona 0.8980 
 Sant Sadurní d'Anoia 0.5880   Vila-seca 0.5520 
 Santa Coloma de Cervelló 1.0000    Deltebre 0.9290 
Average    0.7116 
Standard deviation    0.1724 
Maximum    1.0000 
Minimum       0.2610 
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